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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
FOREIGN BANK SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE
BLOCKING LAWS AS A BARRIER TO SEC
POLICING OF TRANSNATIONAL
SECURITIES FRAUD
Increased capital mobility, expanding multinational corporations and
improved telecommunications and data processing systems allow inves-
tors to transact worldwide business with relative ease. As a result, U.S.
securities markets have become increasingly internationalized. This phe-
nomenon has significantly complicated the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) task of "insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and hon-
est markets."'
The SEC faces many enforcement problems when trying to prevent
transnational fraud in United States securities markets.' This Develop-
ment will consider the nature of foreign bank secrecy and disclosure
blocking laws and the problems they pose to pre-trial discovery in securi-
ties fraud cases.3 It will then turn to current judicial and administrative
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976).
2. Before the SEC can engage in pre-trial discovery to investigate transnational securities
fraud allegations, it must establish both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. This aspect of
transnational securities fraud regulation is beyond the scope of this article. However, for a general
discussion of this issue see Fedders, Waiver by Conduct-A Possible Response to the Internationaliza-
tion of the Securities Markets, 6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 1, 17-21 (1984) (summarizing
earliest bases for court jurisdiction, minimum contacts test and application of these theories to trans-
national securities transactions); Note, The SEC's Waiver by Conduct Proposal: A Critical Appraisal,
71 VA. L. Rnv. 1411, 1428-29 (1985) (hereinafter Critical Appraisal) (discussing various doctrines as
well as case law defining the limits of U.S. jurisdiction); Thomas, Extra-Territoriality in an Era of
Internationalization of the Securities Markets: The Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L.
REV. 452, 456-59 (1983) (discussing "conduct" and "effects" tests as applied by courts in finding
subject matter jurisdiction); Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310 (1985) (hereinafter Common Principles) (discussing
the American Law Institute's proposed "standard of reasonableness" to determine the proper scope
of U.S. jurisdiction); Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Transnational Securities Fraud: A Sug-
gested Roadmap to the New Standard of Reasonableness, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 919 (1986) (hereinaf-
ter Roadmap).
3. See generally, Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets Methods to Obtain
Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 89 (1984) (discussing the SEC's investigatory duties and powers).
The scope of this article is limited to transnational securities fraud perpetrated by foreign inves-
tors. It does not extend to foreign issues. For a discussion of that aspect of the SEC's regulatory
task see Thomas, supra note 2, at 468-71.
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efforts to deal with such laws and these efforts' shortcomings. This De-
velopment will conclude by examining the relationship of both bilateral
treaties4 and the "waiver by conduct" doctrine5 to a system which could
enable the SEC to fulfill its regulatory duties.
I. SECRECY AND BLOCKING LAWS
In order to effectively preserve the integrity of United States securities
markets, the SEC must be able to thoroughly investigate all instances of
securities fraud which either impact on or take place in those markets.6
The SEC encounters problems when transactions are carried out through
foreign financial institutions protected by bank secrecy and disclosure
blocking laws. Usually foreign banks maintain accounts with U.S. bro-
kers who then transact bank clients' business.7 Profits and losses are
credited through the banks to individual clients whose anonymity is
guaranteed by the secrecy and blocking laws.
Secrecy laws prohibit disclosure of bank account details, including
bank client identities, thus protecting personal privacy.' In contrast to
secrecy laws, blocking laws protect national sovereignty from foreign ju-
dicial and administrative encroachment.9 These laws constitute part of
foreign privacy rights, violation of which could give rise to foreign civil
and criminal liability.10
4. See infra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 62-87 and accompanying text.
6. As Congress stated in 1970:
"Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have permitted a
proliferation of 'white collar' crime ... [and] have allowed Americans and others to avoid
the laws and regulations concerning securities and exchanges ... The debilitating effects
of the use of these secret institutions on Americans and on the American economy arc
vast."
H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4394,
4397.
7. Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess. 12 (1969-70) (statement of Pierre Leval).
8. Fedders, supra note 2, at 30-35. Bank secrecy laws have been in existence since the six-
teenth century and are in force in over twenty countries. Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 1414-15
and accompanying notes.
9. Fedders, supra note 2, at 35-39.
10. Critical Appraisal, supra note 2 at 1414, n. 23. See also Fedders, supra note 2, at 33. See
also United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago 699 F.2d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1983) (bank's
release of information requested in the Internal Revenue Summons would subject bank employees to
risk of imprisonment under Greek law); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (9th
Cir. 1981) (Swiss release of confidential information to foreign governmental agencies does not pre-
clude enforcement and sanctions for failure of summons to comply issued to obtain Swiss records).
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II. CASE LAW
The SEC is charged with implementing the federal securities laws so as
to "insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets."11  This task
largely depends on its investigatory powers. Under the securities laws,
the SEC has subpoena powers over both witnesses and documents. 12 If
either domestic or foreign parties refuse to obey a subpoena, the SEC can
invoke the aid of district courts to obtain orders requiring the production
of documents.13
If the person or documents subpoenaed are in the United States, the
SEC encounters few service barriers. However, subpoenas cannot be
served outside the United States without the consent of the foreign gov-
ernments involved. 4 Consent is necessary in order for the practice not
to impinge on national sovereignty or violate international law.' 5
The SEC runs into this consent barrier when it attempts to obtain pre-
trial discovery from foreign banks. In S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana 16 the District Court for the Southern District of New York con-
firmed the SEC's power to obtain discovery from foreign banks in con-
nection with enforcement proceedings. In this case, Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana (BSI) refused to provide the SEC with information
about bank clients suspected of insider trading.'7 The court ordered BSI
to either disclose the information (despite Swiss secrecy laws) or face a
$50,000/day fine and a ban on trading in United States securities mar-
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
12. Securities Act of 1933 Sections 19(b), 22(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 s (b), 77 v (b) (1976); Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 Section 21(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78 u (a)-(c) (1976).
13. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(11 th Cir. 1982) (Despite Bahamian bank secrecy law, the court affirmed an order enforcing a grand
jury subpoena served on a Miami branch of a Canadian bank to obtain documents held in a Baha-
mian branch.); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Minas De Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215, 218
(9th Cir. 1945) (The SEC obtained enforcement of an administrative subpoena, pursuant to section
19(b) of the Securities Act.).
14. Fedders, supra note 2, at 7, citing Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie De Saint
Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Direct service of U.S. subpoenas over-
seas is legal under international law when the foreign government consents by subscribing to an
international convention allowing service of compulsory process on its citizens).
15. Fedders, supra note 2, at 7.
16. 92 F.R.D. 111, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (The Court balanced the interests at stake and con-
cluded that compelling discovery was necessary to maintain the integrity of the securities markets).
17. Id. at 113. BSI bought call options and common stock of a target corporation immediately
prior to the public announcement of a cash tender offer for all St. Joe common stock. Following the
announcement, BSI closed out the purchases of options and sold two-thirds of the common stock
shares for a two million dollar profit. Id. at 112-113.
1987]
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kets.18 Faced with this choice, BSI disclosed the information re-
quested. 9 In making its decision, the court balanced U.S. and Swiss
national interests, the hardship on the defendant, and the degree of good
faith exercised by the resisting party.20 The court determined that the
"vital national interest in maintaining the integrity of [U.S.] securities
markets" outweighed Swiss secrecy laws. 1
In a second effort to obtain information, the SEC requested Swiss
court assistance under the U.S. Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters (1977 Treaty).22 In SEC v. Certain Unknown Pur-
chasers of Santa Fe Stock, defendants made over five million dollars by
18. Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 1418, n.43, citing SEC, Requestfor Comments Concern-
ing a Concept to Improve the Commission's Ability to Investigate and Prosecute Persons who Purchase
or Sell Securities in the US. Markets From Other Countries, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 21,186 at 15. (July 30, 1984), reprinted in 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1305 (1984) [herein-
after Release]. The Release was announced in 49 Fed. Reg. 31,300 (1984). See also Matter of Mare
Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 3555 (1983) (court imposed coer-
cive fine of $50,000 per day to compel a foreign corporation to comply with grand jury subpoena).
19. 92 F.R.D. at 113. The bank secured a waiver of confidentiality and reported to the court.
20. Id. at 117-119. The court relied on section 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES (1965) in coming to its decision. Section 40 reads as
follows:
[W]here two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required
by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed, by that state.
In addition, the court determined that BSI had acted in bad faith in making use of the Swiss nondis-
closure law to evade U.S. laws against insider trading. See also Societe Internationale Pour Partici-
pations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (Sanction of dismissal
without prejudice is unjustified where plaintiff acted in good faith in seeking to comply with discov-
ery order and where Swiss law prohibited such compliance. Noncomplying party's good/bad faith is
an essential factor).
21. 92 F.R.D. at 112. See also United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.
1968) (Court held Citibank in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena duces tecum in a
grand jury investigation into alleged antitrust violations. The court balanced the section 40 Restate-
ment interests, focusing on U.S. and German national interests and the hardship compliance would
place on Citibank); But see In re Westinghouse Electrical Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563
F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (court used § 40 balancing factors and Societe good faith test in lifting
contempt sanctions where Canadian law forbade document production).
22. 1977 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters May 25, 1973, 27 U.S. T. 2019,
T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter 1977 Treaty]. The treaty provides for cooperation in locating wit-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/11
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engaging in insider trading.23 The Swiss court rejected the SEC's first
request for information because the U.S. failed to show that the unknown
defendants had committed a crime under Swiss law, thus failing to satisfy
the 1977 Treaty's "dual criminality" requirement.24 The SEC filed a sec-
ond request which satisfactorily alleged that the unknown defendants
had committed a crime under Swiss law as defined in the 1977 Treaty.25
The Swiss court compelled the bank to reveal the unknown defendants'
identities and the SEC ultimately indicted them.26
III. BILATERAL TREATY OPTIONS
Rather than rely exclusively on the courts to deal with foreign secrecy
and blocking laws,27 the SEC has initiated some bilateral treaty negotia-
tions to improve international securities fraud regulation. In 1982 the
United States and Swiss governments negotiated the Memorandum of
Understanding on Insider Trading (MOU).28
The MOU utilizes the procedures set forth in the 1977 Treaty which
facilitates bilateral cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions.29 Under the 1977 Treaty's dual criminality requirement, the activ-
ity under investigation must be a crime in both jurisdictions before
assistance will be granted.3" Because insider trading is not yet a crime in
Switzerland,3 and the 1977 Treaty covers only criminal matters,3 2 the
nesses, obtaining statements and production and authentications of judicial and administrative
documents.
23. 81 Civ. 6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), reprinted in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) P99,424, July 25, 1983 (unknown investors purchased securities in a target corporation
through a Swiss bank immediately before the announcement of a merger and tender offer).
24. To invoke the Treaty, the invoking party must show that the alleged offense is a crime
under Swiss law. Under Swiss law, insider trading is not a crime. 1977 Treaty, supra note 23 at art.
4, para. 2(a).
25. 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 861 (1984).
26. Id.
27. See AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984)
(court held that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over securities fraud action brought by Dutch
citizen against Dutch partnership but that the action was properly dismissed pursuant to a forum
selection clause in the agreement calling for application of Dutch law).
28. 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1737 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983). Section I, para.
1 of the MOU states the purpose of the treaty to be that of "establish[ing] mutually acceptable means
for improving international law enforcement cooperation in the field of insider trading."
29. Id. at § II.
30. 1977 Treaty, supra note 22 at art. 4, para. 2(a).
31. MOU, supra note 28 at § I, para. 2.
32. Id. at § III, para. 1. See generally Recent Developments, InternationalAgreements: United
Washington University Open Scholarship
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SEC cannot ask for Swiss assistance under that Treaty. For that reason
it became necessary to negotiate the MOU to cover insider trading.
The first section of the MOU contains an "exchange of opinions" re-
garding the 1977 Treaty.33 In this section the parties agree that under
specified circumstances insider trading could constitute "fraud," "un-
faithful management" or "violation of business secrets" under the Swiss
Penal Code, thus rendering assistance under the 1977 Treaty
compulsory.34
The second part of the MOU consists of a "Private Agreement"
among members of the Swiss Bankers' Association.35 The Agreement
recognizes that the SEC may not always be able to prove a violation of
the Swiss Penal Code. 36 The Agreement provides for the creation of a
Commission of Enquiry (Commission) to decide if SEC assistance re-
quests are "reasonable., 37
The SEC may establish reasonableness in two ways. First, it can show
significant volume and price fluctations in the traded security occurring
prior to the public announcement of "a proposed merger, consolidation
sale of . . .assets or other business combination. ' 38  Second, if these
threshold criteria are not met, the SEC can show that the activity vio-
States-Switzerland Investigation of Insider Trading Through Swiss Banks, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 437
(1983) (detailed discussion of the MOLT).
33. MOU, supra note 28 at § II.
34. Id. at § Ii, para. 3(b).
35. Id. at § III. This agreement applies only to signatory banks and 'business combinations'
and 'acquisitions.' Business Combinations refer to "a proposed merger, consolidation, sale of sub-
stantially all of an issuer's assets or other similar business combination." Acquisition refers to "the
proposed acquisition of at least 10% of the securities of the issuer by open market purchase, tender
offer or otherwise." Id. at Agreement XVI, art. 1.
36. Id. at § III. In keeping with the double criminality requirement (see supra note 24 and
accompanying text) under the 1977 Treaty, the alleged offense must be a crime under both Swiss and
U.S. law before Swiss authorities will assist U.S. investigators.
37. Id. at Agreement XVI, art. 2. The Board of Directors of the Swiss Bankers' Association
will appoint the Commission composed of three members and three deputies. These appointees are
bound by Swiss secrecy laws.
38. Id. at art. 1. As specified in the Private Agreement,
"the Commission shall be satisfied in all cases in which the daily trading volume of such
securities increased 50% or more at any time during the 25 days prior to "an announce-
ment of an Acquisition or Business Combination, above the average daily trading volume
of such securities during the period from the 90th trading day to the 30th trading day prior
to such announcement or the price of such securities varied at least 50% or more during
the 25 days prior to the announcement."
Id. at art. 3.4. The parties to the Agreement note that these thresholds are set at high levels in order
to clearly define the instances in which the Commission "shall" determine that the SEC has reason-
able grounds to make the request. Id. at § III, para. 3.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/11
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lated U.S. insider trading laws.39 In such cases, the Commission must
still decide if this constitutes "reasonable" grounds for requesting
assistance. °
If the Commission accepts the SEC's request, it will call for a bank
report on the pertinent transaction(s)41 and may order the bank to freeze
the client's account in the amount of the profit made or loss avoided.42
All this information goes to the Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters
which, in turn, transmits it to the SEC.4 3 Depending on the outcome of
the eventual U.S. litigation, the Commission will either remit the funds
to the SEC or unblock the account.' This Private Agreement will con-
tinue in force until Switzerland makes insider trading a crime under its
penal statutes.45
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BILATERAL TREATY APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD REGULATION
Treaty negotiation and implementation is most successful when parties
39. Id. at Agreement, art. 3.4.
40. Id. at § III, para. 3. The MOU clearly states that SEC failure to satisfy the specified thresh-
old criteria will not result in any presumption that the SEC's request is unreasonable.
41. Id. at Agreement, art. 4.1-4.4. As soon as it receives the informational request from the
Commission, the bank must inform its customer and invite him or her to voluntarily furnish the
information. This report is filed with the Commission within 45 days of the request. If these condi-
tions go unfulfilled, the Commission shall give the Federal Office for Police Matters a written expla-
nation, to be forwarded to the SEC. Id. at art. 7. If there is any doubt as to the material adequacy of
the report furnished, either the Commission or the SEC may request the Federal Banking Commis-
sion to ascertain whether the report conforms to the facts. Id. at art. 8.
42. Id. at art. 9. The bank shall place such amount in an interest bearing account at the Com-
mission's disposal.
43. Id. at art. 5. The MOU contains a large loophole which allows the Swiss Federal Office for
Police Matters to determine that a report submitted by a bank may not be transmitted to the SEC
when transmission would harm Swiss national interests or a third person's interests with no connec-
tion to the alleged offense. However, in such cases, it is agreed that the Federal Office will adapt the
report to provide useful information to the SEC without harming any protected interest. Id. at § III,
para. 6.
44. Id. at Agreement, art. 9.2-9.3. The Commission will remit the amount held to the SEC if
the amount requested is no higher than the unlawful profit and either the U.S. court proceedings
have ended in a final judgment against the bank customer or the customer consents in writing. The
account will be unblocked if by the thirtieth day after the federal office forwarded the bank report to
the SEC, no request is received or no amended report pursuant to Article 8 is issued or the U.S.
court proceedings end in favor of the bank customer or the SEC consents in writing.
45. Id. at art. 11. See Critical Appraisal, supra note 2 at 1414, n.27 and accompanying text. In
1984, 73% of Swiss voters rejected a proposal to relax Swiss secrecy laws. Thus, even if insider
trading is made a crime in Switzerland, the overwhelming popular sentiment is against any weaken-
ing in bank secrecy protection.
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share common policy goals and regulatory setups. Substantive differ-
ences among nations' insider trading laws and regulatory philosophies
are, however, common in the securities fraud area.4 6 These differences
complicate U.S. efforts to negotiate cooperation treaties with foreign na-
tions whose citizens engage in securities transactions in U.S. markets.
In Europe, only France and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have enacted
legislation regulating the improper use of insider information.47 The
French statute is rarely enforced,4" apparently because "such activities
were a tradition on the part of most respectable directors and officers
and . . . tipping was even a social duty expected of relatives and
friends."49 The U.K. considers U.S. laws which allow class actions, con-
tingency fees and liberal discovery in connection with securities fraud
investigations to be biased in favor of plaintiffs.50 Neither the U.K. nor
Switzerland recognizes a cause of action for failure to state a material
fact, and Germany requires a deceptive or misleading representation to
state a cause of action.5 French and Swiss courts require plaintiffs to
affirmatively prove that their losses were caused by defendants' misrepre-
sentations, while U.S. courts presume causation.5 2
The MOU itself suffers from several serious shortcomings. First, it
was a product of necessity. 3 Second, the MOU applies only to securities
fraud in connection with "acquisitions" and "business combinations. 5 4
Furthermore, the MOU is binding only on those Swiss banks which sign
it,55 and even then, if a signatory bank refuses a Commission informa-
46. See infra notes 47 and accompanying text.
47. Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW 345, 346 (1982).
48. See Roadmap, supra note 2, at 936 nn.l11-112 citing MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES-
CORPORATE INSIDERS, 50 (L. Loss ed. 1975) (In the four years after the French statute was adopted,
the Commissoin de Bourse (COB), responsible for regulating securities trading, undertook 105 in-
quiries into possible insider trading and referred only seven cases for prosecution). See also Mac-
querou, Developments in French Law on Disclosure and Trading of Securities, 5 J. COMP. Bus. &
CAP. MARKET L. 71,74 (1983) (in 1979 the Paris criminal court handed down only two convictions
for insider trading out of only four cases referred by the COB).
49. Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 757, 762 (1982).
50. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981), See also Taylor & Head,
Representing Collective Interests: A Comparative Synopsis, 58 J. URB. L. 587, 595 (1981) (in Canada
only Quebec allows class actions).
51. See Roadmap, supra note 2, at n.106 and accompanying text.
52. Id. at nn.107-08 and accompanying text.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
54. See supra note 35.
55. MOU, supra 28 at § III para. 2.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss1/11
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tional request, that bank will simply be excluded from the Agreement. 6
Moreover, because this Treaty is only between the U.S. and Switzerland,
other states' secrecy and blocking laws remain unaffected by the MOU.17
The shortcomings of the MOU are the product not only of divergent
regulatory philosophies but also of different market conditions, goals and
strategies.58 U.S. courts and administrative agencies cannot assume that
all nations opposed to fraud will have compatible regulatory schemes.59
For this reason, the only viable way to contend with divergent national
policies (or lack thereof) on insider trading is through bilateral treaty
negotiations. The SEC, however, has stated that despite the apparent
success of the MOU, multilateral negotiations have little chance of suc-
cess given the "large number of nations with secrecy laws and the diver-
sity of their interests."'  Furthermore, bilateral agreements are "time
consuming to negotiate" and of limited applicability.61 As a result, the
SEC has considered unilateral solutions to facilitate its enforcement
efforts.
V. WAIVER BY CONDUCT DOCTRINE
In 1984, the SEC proposed a "waiver by conduct" statute to replace its
56. See MOU, supra note 28, at Agreement, art. 10 (The Board of Directors of the Swiss Bank-
ers' Association will first issue a warning to the non-cooperating bank before excluding it from the
Agreement).
57. See generally Fedders, supra note 2, at 30-39 (overview of secrecy and blocking disclosure
laws presently in force around the world).
58. See generally Krauss, Securities Regulation in the United Kingdom: A Comparison with
United States Practice, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 49 (1971); Note, Disclosure Requirements in
France: Problems in the Development of Effective Securities Regulation, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 358
(1972); Krauss, Securities Regulation in Germany? Investor's Remedies for Misleading Statements by
Issues, 19 INT'L LAW 109 (1984).
59. See, eg., Grunenthal Grub H v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582, 587 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (There is
no need to consider foreign national interests because "every civilized nation doubtless has this [an-
tifraud rule] as part of its legal system), rev'd on othergrounds, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1982). But see
supra note 10 (courts do take into consideration the fact that foreign laws may subject persons to
criminal liability in determining whether to compel information production); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S.Ct. 3514 (1985) (ab-
sence of specific regulation by foreign state does not necessarily reflect a lack of conflict with U.S.
policies). See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter REVISED RESTATEMENT] (In determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or
unreasonable, the court must take into consideration factors such as "the extent to which another
state may have an interest in regulating the activity" and "the likelihood of conflict with regulation
by other states." When both states have regulatory interests each state is expected to "defer to the
other state if that state's interest is greater").
60. See Critical Appraisal, supra note 22 at 1421, citing Release, supra note 18 at 20-21.
61. Id.
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case-by-case approach to transnational securities fraud investigations.62
The proposed statute would apply the doctrine of implied consent 63 to
the idea that "the act of trading securities in the U.S. whether directly or
indirectly [should] serve as a waiver by conduct of the applicability of
foreign secrecy laws."'  Once notice about such a waiver statute is im-
puted through agency principles from the U.S. broker to the foreign in-
vestor, evidence of a securities transaction would be interpreted to mean
that the investor waived secrecy law protection.6" When an investor
62. Mr. John M. Fedders, Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC has acted as the
SEC's main spokesman in promoting the "waiver by conduct" concept. On March 30, 1984, Fed-
ders wrote to Sen. D'Amato and Rep. Dingell suggesting that Congress adopt legislation to codify
the concept. The SEC considered the concept on May 31, 1984 and requested public comments on it
on July 30, 1984. After receiving overwhelmingly negative comments, the SEC postponed any final
decision. Critical Appraisal, supra note 2 at p. 1412 nn.10-11. See also Fedders, supra note 2 and
Fedders, Policing Internationalized US. Capital Markets Methods to Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18
INT'L LAW 89 (1984).
63. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (One who purposefully avails himself of
the benefits of conducting business in a state thereby involving the protection of its laws, must sub-
mit to its jurisdiction.).
64. Critical'Appraisal, supra note 22 at 1421, citing Release, supra note 18 at 7. Also note that
the concept addresses only secrecy laws, leaving disclosure blocking legislation intact. For further
discussion see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
65. CriticalAppraisal, supra note 2 at 1421, citing Release, supra note 18 at 30-31. The issue of
the court's subject matter jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article. However, a short discus-
sion is in order here. In determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, courts have tradi-
tionally looked to either the conduct or the effects test as set out in section 17 and 18 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1965). The conduct test [in Section 17] is
as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law:
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory whether or not such
consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
Section 18 of the Restatement contains the effects test:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either:
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or
tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule
applies, (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial, (iii) it occurs as a direct and fore-
seeable result of the conduct outside the territory, and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with
the principles ofjustice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems.
In 1985, the American Law Institute adopted a standard of "reasonableness" by which to weigh
competing national interests. See also supra note 59. For relevant case law applying the conduct
and effects tests see Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir.), modified on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert denied sub. nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395
U.S. 906 (1969) (effects test first applied to transnational securities transaction); Leasco Data Process-
ing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-39 (2d Cir. 1972) ("significant conduct" in the
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chooses to venture outside the jurisdiction whose secrecy laws she claims
to be protected by, she cannot reasonably expect that protection to follow
her to other jurisdictions-or so the theory goes.
Deferring to foreign secrecy laws sets up a double standard on U.S.
securities exchanges under which insider trading is protected if carried
out by a foreign investor but forbidden to domestic investors.66 Indis-
criminate application of secrecy laws threatens U.S. sovereignty by im-
pinging on its vested interest in protecting the integrity of its securities
markets and shielding investors from securities fraud. However, adopt-
ing a waiver by conduct statute as the exclusive remedy to address these
issues could cause more problems than it would solve.
VI. SHORTCOMINGS OF A WAIVER BY CONDUCT STATUTE
The waiver conduct doctrine is a unilateral approach to an interna-
tional problem. It goes against the spirit of negotiated agreements and
threatens foreign nations' rights to regulate domestic banking relation-
ships.67 The statute would attempt to deprive foreign bank customers of
their secrecy rights and subject their personal information to U.S. scru-
tiny.68 Although the SEC believes its doctrine will promote comity and
international cooperation, the proposal could instead cause an interna-
tional backlash in the form of less cooperation and tighter secrecy
protection.69
United States by a nonresident defendant is enough for U.S. jurisdiction); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.) cert. denied sub. nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018
(1975) (absent fraudulent conduct, U.S. jurisdiction exists only in cases of direct injury to person in
whom the U.S. has an interest); HITv. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (absent domestic effects,
the fraudulent conduct must have occurred primarily in the U.S.); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
722 F.2d 1041 (1983) (followed Cornfeld in finding that both the conduct and effects tests were
satisfied because the essential conduct necessary to complete the fraud occurred in the U.S.).
66. If an individual executes securities transactions based on inside information through foreign
banks shielded by protective secrecy and disclosure blocking laws that individual is also shielded
from liability. Domestic investors do not benefit from such protection. See Critical Appraisal, supra
note 2, at 1411; Fedders, supra note 3, at 92.
67. Nations jealousy guard their sovereignty and resent any encroachment by other nations.
See generally REvIsED RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 403 reporter's note 1.
68. In general, those protected by secrecy laws are very reluctant to have that protection dimin-
ished in any way. See Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 1415 n.27 (Swiss and West German citizens
overwhelmingly opposed proposals to relax secrecy laws).
69. See Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 1425-26 (notes paradox that waiver by conduct could
also cause "a decline in the quality and integrity of the trading in U.S. Securities." It could drive
foreign investors away, shift investments to offshore markets and impose undue burdens on U.S.
brokers who would have to act as agents for service of process on foreign clients).
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Foreign nations would be free to reject a waiver by conduct statute by
refusing to recognize waivers and compelling their banks to abide by se-
crecy laws. In such cases, the SEC could resort to U.S. court orders
compelling discovery.70 If, however, the banks lack assets in the U.S.
upon which to levy contempt sanctions, such court orders could prove
useless. 71 In any event, it is highly unlikely that any foreign bank would
contravene governmental orders not to disclose any information.
The most serious shortcoming of a waiver by conduct statute would be
that it would affect only secrecy laws and would leave disclosure block-
ing protections intact. "The right involved [in blocking statutes] is that
of the government itself [and] it cannot be waived by a private person." '72
Thus, SEC investigations in disclosure blocking jurisdictions would con-
tinue to suffer from a lack of foreign governmental cooperation.
VII. PROPOSAL
In order for the SEC to effectively enforce its securities regulations, the
shortcomings of both the unilateral and bilateral approaches must be ad-
dressed. In so doing, one must consider the competing interests of the
U.S. and foreign nations whose citizens transact business in U.S. securi-
ties markets.73 Bilateral negotiation provides the best forum for achiev-
ing this. In negotiating workable treaties which will give the SEC access
to the information it needs without threatening foreign state sovereignty,
the SEC should consider several factors.
First, the SEC must avoid overzealous, chauvinistic application of U.S.
law. This will only alienate foreign governments and defeat the purpose
of bilateral negotiations. "[T]he more the relevant national interests and
policies conflict, the more another state will perceive American regula-
tion as an affront to its power to determine its own regulatory goals."'74
Of equal importance, however, is the goal of protecting U.S. securities
markets and giving the SEC access to the information it needs.7" Not
only must a treaty be sensitive to competing national goals, but it must
70. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
72. See Critical Appraisal, supra note 2 at 1423 n.88, citing Release, supra note 18, at 49.
73. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. See also REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra
note 59, at § 403(1) - (2)(h) and § 403(3). Section 403 imposes "Limitations on Jurisdiction to Pre-
scribe" which shape U.S. decisions to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity.
74. Roadmap, supra note 2, at 939.
75. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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also be predictable and uniformly applied.7 6 Predictability will enable
foreign investors to determine the scope of potential liability and con-
form their actions accordingly. 77  Furthermore, liability must be uni-
form in the interest of both predictability and fairness.
In balancing these factors, the SEC should implement a two-tiered ap-
proach which optimizes the strengths of the unilateral and bilateral op-
tions while minimizing their weaknesses. In the long run, bilateral
negotiation is the only way to ensure that each nation's interests are pro-
tected.78 This is, of course, more time consuming and costly in the short
run than a unilaterally imposed solution.7 9 Individually binding treaties
are, however, the only feasible way to guarantee consistent, voluntary
cooperation from foreign governments. At the very least, treaty negotia-
tion leaves channels of communication open. Because each treaty must
be tailored to fit national policies, market conditions and legislation of
the foreign signatory, the SEC would have to engage in a case-by-case
analysis during its investigations. On balance, however, protecting the
integrity of U.S. securities markets justifies this cost.
While treaty negotiations are taking place, the SEC must establish
short term regulatory procedures to control incoming transactions from
countries with which the U.S. has no treaty." Such short-term measures
could be unilaterally imposed to affect investment orders as they enter
the U.S.81 These regulations would require investors to either identify
themselves or be denied access to U.S. markets. Thus, U.S. brokers
would be required to ascertain their clients' identities before transacting
76. See Roadmap, supra note 2, at 939-40, citing Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Cross-
roads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 316,
320 (1982). See also Common Principles supra note 2, at 1319-1323 ("Guaging the merit of jurisdic-
tional standards according to the principles of predictability and comity will promote a system con-
ducive to international business planning and cooperation among nations").
77. Common Principles, supra note 2, at 1321.
78. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971) (Burger, C.J.) ("[W]e cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets ... exclusively on our own terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts").
79. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
80. See Fedders, supra note 2, at 27-28 (lists six specific ways to legislatively implement the
waiver by conduct theory).
81. See Critical Appraisal, supra note 2, at 1416 (discusses proposed amendment to the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970 which would have "prohibited U.S. brokers from accepting orders for transac-
tions in U.S. securities from foreign banks unless the orders disclosed the identity of all persons
having any beneficial interest in the transactions or certified that no citizen or resident of the U.S.
has any beneficial interest in the transactions").
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any business for them.12 This information would be available to the SEC
upon demand. Brokers who transacted business for unidentified clients
would be subject to civil and criminal liability.83
This unilateral approach implicates the international banking system
through which most transnational securities business is transacted. The
U.S. government would have to require banks handling such transactions
for their clients to maintain U.S. assets which would be subject to con-
tempt sanctions for not complying with SEC information requests or
U.S. court orders.84 If it would impose too great a hardship on banks to
establish a U.S. presence, they could instead make a "security deposit"
with a Federal Reserve Bank. This desposit could guarantee the bank
client's U.S. transactions and could be subject to contempt sanctions and
fines.85
This proposed approach is preferable to a waiver by conduct statute in
several ways. It would prevent enforcement difficulties by obtaining in-
vestor identities and securing bank assets before allowing foreign inves-
tors to transact business in U.S. markets. It would eliminate the need to
deal with secrecy and blocking laws and would not be perceived as an
unwelcome extraterritorial imposition of U.S. law.86 Under a waiver by
conduct statute, by its very nature, the SEC would have to be content
with asserting a waiver after the alleged fraud has already been
perpetrated.
Forcing foreign investors and banks to bear the financial and regula-
tory brunt of complying with these short term measures will give them
some impetus to lobby their governments to negotiate treaties with the
U.S. and cooperate with SEC investigations. Foreign investors have the
luxury of choosing to transact business in U.S. security markets-they
must therefore play by the rules. Once a foreign nation negotiates and
implements a treaty with the U.S., the short-term regulations will expire
for banks and investors from that nation. This two-tiered approach
would best serve the aforementioned goals of effective enforcement of
82. In the process, these clients would be put on notice about U.S. law by imputing the broker's
knowledge to the investor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9(3) (1957). Section 9(3)
provides that "[a] person has notice of a fact if his agent has knowledge of the fact, reason to know it
or should know it, or has been given notification of it."
83. Recall that secrecy and disclosure blocking laws are part of foreign privacy rights, violation
of which could give rise to civil and criminal penalties. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 18 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 71.
86. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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U.S. securities regulation, sensitivity to competing national interests, sov-
ereignty, predictability, uniformity and fairness.8 7
Yvonne G. Grassie
ETHICAL CONFLICTS IN THE RECOMMENDATION
OF POISON PILLS
The proliferation of corporate mergers and acquisitions has spawned
law firms specializing in corporate takeovers. 1 These law firms generally
counsel both targets and acquirors. This may confront firms with ethical
conflicts of interests.2 For example, in a recent newspaper account, New
York's Skadden, Arps, Meagher & Flom was challenged for drafting
over two dozen poison pill plans to repel hostile takeovers and, within a
year, arguing in federal court against the constitutionality of similar
plans on behalf of a hostile aggressor.3
This recent development considers the ethical repercussions of a single
law firm recommending antitakeover poison pill plans to some clients
and shortly thereafter contesting the constitutionality of similar plans on
behalf of other clients. Part I reviews the American Bar Association
standards governing concurrent and subsequent representation.4 Part II
applies these standards to specialty firms who recommend then challenge
similar antitakeover poison pill plans.' This development concludes that
87. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
1. See Berner, Conflict of Interest Case, Developments and Vicarious Disqualification, in Thir-
teenth Institute on Securities Regulation 621, 623-37 (1981) (Berner chronicles the development of
law firms from solo or small firms in 1910 when the largest New York law firm had 17 lawyers to
large, multi-office firms of the 1980s).
2. See generally Miller and Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and
Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 631, 631-33, (1985); see supra, Berner note 1 at 623-27.
3. See, Waldman, Skadden Arp's Poison-Pill Stance Raises Conflict of Interest Concern, Wall
St. J., July 23, 1986, 2, at 1, col. 3. Skadden, Arps is cocounsel with two other law firms. The
defendant's answer to the suit challenged the poison pill provisions as against state law, as over-
reaching the powers of the directors, and if the plan was authorized by state law, the plan impermis-
sibly burdened interstate commerce and violated the United States Constitution. Skadden, Arps
denied the representation conflicted with its drafting of poison pill plans for other clients.
4. See infra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
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